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Executive Summary 
 
This report examines three central policy challenges arising from the UK’s need 
to renew and rethink bilateral relations with key European countries after Brexit: 
• What agenda should drive specific diplomatic relationships and how can 
economic and institutional resources best be devoted to this objective?  
• How far can bilateralism recreate, or substitute for, the so-called “multiplier 
effect” of EU membership and maintain UK aspirations for a prominent 
global role? 
• Finally, as a multi-national state, how will the UK’s changing relations with 
the EU be mediated by devolution arrangements, which themselves are in 
flux? 
 
The UK and Spain 
• There is appetite on both sides for a stronger UK-Spain bilateral 
relationship, but there is a practical challenge regarding policy 
fragmentation across UK government departments. 
• London must make sure Spain is given appropriate consideration, especially 
because of Madrid’s potentially increasing influence in the EU – although 
unprecedented Spanish parliamentary fragmentation is leading to policy 
uncertainty.  
 
The UK and the Visegrad Four 
• They all label the UK an important partner and most likely support 
arrangements allowing some UK participation in EU decision-making, but 
goodwill would be jeopardized if the UK reneges on its promises regarding 
the future rights of EU citizens living in Britain.  
• Political engagement with Hungary and Poland carries reputational risk for 
the UK, although their leaders will be grateful for any additional 
legitimization that they can derive from such engagement. 
 
The UK and France 
• This deeply institutionalized relationship can withstand potential Brexit-
related acrimony, especially since both countries share global ambitions 
for which the EU itself is not always a necessary and sufficient instrument. 
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• Heightened UK expectations of enhanced bilateralism are counterbalanced 
by the possibility of disappointment as the UK struggles with the 
coherence of its objectives and France will not always have the sway to 
sustain joint EU-UK enterprises. 
 
The UK and Turkey 
• Turkey’s trade relations with the UK have special meaning in the current 
economic climate and because the outcome of the Brexit negotiations 
could help reframe Turkey’s bilateral ties with the EU. 
• The UK can mediate to reduce regional tensions involving Turkey, but 
balancing good relations with Ankara while raising concerns over human 
rights and democracy poses a challenge for London. 
 
Devolution and UK Diplomacy 
• The EU footprint of Britain’s nations and regions will have to be recalibrated 
as Brexit enhances the incentive for Britain’s devolved authorities to foster 
relations in Europe via regional representative offices. 
• Coordination among devolved authorities is vital, especially in the 
contentious area of EU-UK trade – hence the need to set out common 
frameworks, including to provide policy coherence to preserve the UK’s 
single market.  
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Introduction: Renewing and Rethinking Bilateralism after Brexit 
 
Andrew Glencross 
 
In the post-1945 international order, the UK’s influence was rooted in its 
membership of three organizations: NATO, the permanent five of the UN Security 
Council, and the European Union.  This presence at the heart of the institutional 
architecture of multilateral diplomacy – combined with the cultivation of a close 
relationship with the United States – enabled a succession of British governments 
to talk up their global influence. Brexit fundamentally alters the UK’s stance 
towards multilateralism because multilateral leadership in the EU and on the world 
stage previously went hand in hand. The UK practiced, and this was one of the 
chief reasons for joining the EEC in 1973, a “multipronged European diplomatic 
strategy” that consisted of treating EU relations as a subset of its broader 
international diplomatic strategy for promoting free trade, human rights, and a 
rules based order.1 British governments of different political stripes notably sought 
to be a bridge between Europe and the US as part of their “special relationship” 
with Washington. Indeed, reflecting the fact that post-war US-UK relations were 
based on power asymmetry, US administrations actively encouraged UK 
integration with European peers. Even when diffident about encroaching on the 
transatlantic security partnership, the UK came to cultivate EU support for its own 
approach towards economic relations with China or for dealing with security 
threats posed by Russia. 
 
Outside the EU club, the way the UK engages with the world is necessarily very 
different. The British government will have no seat at the table to influence EU 
foreign policy in a direction it favours, thereby reducing the importance of London 
for US policy-makers. The EU could also evolve in a way that goes against long-
standing UK policy preferences – there are intimations of a more protectionist 
approach to trade based on how France and Germany are promoting an EU 
                                                          
1 Whitman, R.G., 2016. ‘Brexit or Bremain: what future for the UK's European diplomatic strategy?’ 
International Affairs, 92(3), pp.509-529. 
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industrial strategy designed in part to restrict Chinese investment in strategic 
sectors.2 Consequently, this report explores the challenges facing the UK as it 
seeks to engage with the EU on a bilateral basis by nurturing relationships with 
key member states and their leaders.  
 
Relying on bilateral ties to influence the EU from the outside is a highly demanding 
proposition. This kind of engagement is more fickle, because it is based on 
personal relations between leaders that can be upended by shifting political 
currents at home or abroad, compared with the highly institutionalized and law-
governed relations that constitute EU membership. Hence the approach taken 
here is to examine three of the central policy challenges that emerge from the 
UK’s predicament of having to renew and in many ways rethink bilateral relations 
with key European countries.  
 
The first challenge concerns the ways and means of nurturing bilateral relations 
in a set of countries that had slipped down the list of UK diplomatic priorities. What 
agenda should drive specific relationships and how can economic and institutional 
resources best be devoted to this objective? The second policy question explored 
here is the issue of how far the UK’s aspirations for a prominent role in global 
multilateral leadership, notably in the UN but also in institutions such as the WTO, 
can be reconciled with an EU-UK partnership built on a web of bilateral relations. 
That is, what can bilateralism do to recreate, or substitute for, the so-called 
“multiplier effect” of EU membership by developing a consensual EU-UK approach 
to global problems? Finally, it is important to remember that the UK is a multi-
national state with a complex system of devolved governance. So how will the 
UK’s changing relations with the EU be mediated by devolution arrangements, 
which themselves are in flux? 
 
The contributions offered here thus explore these fundamental questions as they 
pertain to specific instances of inter-state diplomacy and, more generally, 
devolution and EU policy after Brexit. The bilateral relationships selected for 
inclusion in this report reflect the variety of cross-cutting economic, security, and 
                                                          
2 ‘Germany, France agree industrial policy plan for Europe’, Reuters, 19 February 2019 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-france-industrial-policy-idUSKCN1Q81IO  
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diplomatic concerns that characterize UK engagement with Europe after Brexit. 
UK relations with France, Germany, Spain, Turkey, and the Visegrad Four (V4; the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) are scrutinized to determine how 
far bilateralism is likely to address the first two policy challenges described above. 
The final chapter brings back in to focus the complicating factor of devolution, 
looking at how territorial governance arrangements elsewhere in Europe can 
provide lessons on conducting “paradiplomacy” with the EU. 
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2. Brexit and the UK-Spain Diplomatic Relationship 
 
Caroline Gray 
 
The UK and Spain do not benefit from the history of institutionalised bilateral 
cooperation outside the EU framework that characterises the UK’s relations with 
France, for example. Moreover, the thorny question of Gibraltar continues, in part, 
to militate against a closer political relationship. The two countries do, however, 
share a huge amount in economic and people-to-people terms. The UK is the main 
destination of Spanish investment abroad, and the UK is the top European investor 
and second global investor in Spain, behind only the US.3 Spain also hosts the 
largest number of UK citizens living in other EU countries.  
 
Since Spain is not Germany or France, which are usually the primary focus of the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s (FCO) bilateral efforts in Europe, it thus falls 
within the next group of European countries that are particularly important to the 
UK for economic and social reasons. Politically, the relationship is also set to 
become even more important since Spain, one of the most euro-enthusiastic 
countries, looks potentially to be on the cusp of becoming more of a key player in 
the EU context. This makes healthy UK-Spain relations paramount if the UK still 
wants to be able to engage with the direction of the EU from outside its ranks. In 
the context of Brexit, the UK-Spain relationship is thus a key case study to look 
at to assess what the UK government is doing and the challenges it faces to 
strengthen bilateral relations with EU member states beyond France and Germany. 
 
Bolstering bilateral relations: the work of the British embassy in Madrid 
Since the Brexit vote, the FCO, through the work of its Embassy in Madrid, has 
actively taken steps to bolster existing bilateral engagement with Spain in a range 
of economic and public policy matters. Examples of areas under the UK 
government’s Industrial Strategy and wider Prosperity Agenda where activity has 
been particularly strong in Spain include collaborative work on smart cities, as well 
as science and innovation outreach and events. Beyond central government-to-
                                                          
3 Ignacio Molina and Salvador Llaudes, ‘Brexit and the (stronger than it looks) UK-Spain 
relationship’, The UK in a Changing Europe, 1 November 2017. 
https://ukandeu.ac.uk/brexit-and-the-stronger-than-it-looks-uk-spain-relationship/ 
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government collaboration, the British Ambassador and his team have long been 
travelling all over Spain to meet with regional and local leaders to promote trade 
and investment opportunities with the UK and to design bilateral strategies for 
engaging with individual Spanish regions that feature prominently in UK-Spain 
economic relations. This is in recognition of the fact that Spain’s 17 regional 
governments hold many of the responsibilities for industrial policy and delivery of 
the EU’s single market agenda, and certain regions are particularly important to 
UK-Spain relations, most notably (in alphabetical order) Andalusia, the Basque 
Country, Catalonia, Madrid and Valencia. 
 
A clear sign of the UK government’s recognition of the importance of the UK-Spain 
economic relationship came in early 2019 with the appointment of a senior 
diplomat to a newly created role in Madrid as Counsellor responsible for bilateral 
relations and the regions. The post holder is responsible for drawing up the FCO’s 
new UK-Spain bilateral strategy for the post-Brexit context, to be underpinned 
and informed by a regional engagement strategy that reflects the varying 
importance and nature of different Spanish regions to UK-Spain economic 
relations. The role is one of approximately 50 new posts, many at senior diplomat 
level, that the FCO decided to create in Embassies across the EU-27 in the wake 
of the Brexit vote, to boost FCO competence and resources in EU member states. 
This decision followed years of the UK government moving personnel and 
resources away from embassies in Western Europe towards other parts of the 
globe (particularly Asia), relying on the fact that UK representatives interacted 
regularly with their European counterparts in EU institutions in Brussels.4 
 
The fact that the new Counsellor has been tasked with seeking out the best way 
to cooperate with Spain and bolster UK-Spain relations, rather than being given a 
pre-designed, centralised strategy to follow and implement, mirrors the bottom-
up approach of the FCO’s Bilateral Strategy team more widely in its approach to 
future relations with EU member states. The unit was designed to put more 
programme spending into the network and get posts in different EU member states 
talking to each other, due to the prevailing sense that the FCO had not been doing 
                                                          
4 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The FCO’s resources in Europe’, in ‘The 
Future of UK Diplomacy in Europe’, Second Report of Session 2017-2019, pp. 17-
19.https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmfaff/514/514.pdf  
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as much bilaterally as it could have done. Its main approach so far appears to 
have been to seek out successful bilateral initiatives and activities in individual 
Embassies to promote as examples of best practice, which is positive in that it 
allows for country-specific and regional variation where appropriate. 
 
It is not just the FCO that is bolstering resources in Spain and other key EU 
member states, but also the Department for International Trade (DIT). Indeed, 
the two departments go hand-in-hand in the sense that political engagement and 
economic or business engagement are two sides of the same coin under the 
current UK government’s Industrial Strategy and Prosperity Agenda. Thus, DIT 
and the FCO are both working on trade policy to leverage the FCO’s overseas 
network and promote British trade and investment abroad. Almost all of the 
thematic areas that the British Embassy in Madrid is seeking to collaborate on with 
its Spanish counterparts fall under the remit of the four grand challenges identified 
in the Industrial Strategy, namely Artificial Intelligence and Data, the Ageing 
Society, Clean Growth and the Future of Mobility. 5  While most overarching 
agreements in these areas are reached in multilateral fora, the FCO sees bilateral 
engagement as crucial not only to help shape decisions taken in those fora, but 
also to work on best practices for implementation afterwards.  
 
It is widely recognised that value-based work via soft power is generally more 
feasible to do bilaterally than work on specific economic policy issues, which tend 
to be more tied to the EU-policy side. And yet, the FCO can use – and has been 
using – its share of the cross-government Prosperity Fund to forge bilateral 
relations on economy-related projects, such as smart cities, that complement EU 
economic policy making, rather than interfering with it. To reduce the risk of such 
collaboration being subject to the political vagaries of the moment, the UK could 
work towards establishing an official strategic dialogue with Spain akin to the ones 
that it already has with France, Germany and Italy. Neither side wants ongoing 
frictions over the status Gibraltar to reduce the scope for bilateral engagement in 
other areas.    
 
                                                          
5 HM government, Industrial Strategy White Paper, 2017, p. 10. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/664563/industrial-strategy-white-paper-web-ready-version.pdf 
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Challenges to bilateral engagement 
While there are thus opportunities in UK-Spain bilateral relations, there are also 
sizeable challenges. On a practical level, one of the first of these is fragmentation 
across UK government departments. Previous governments had gradually diluted 
international policy making among different departments, thereby reducing the 
FCO’s oversight capacity. Coordination over bilateral relations has thus become 
somewhat disjointed across the various departments dealing with international 
policy issues including, most notably, the FCO and DIT, but also others such as 
the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). After the UK 
leaves the EU, it all needs to be more joined up again, and the FCO should lead 
on that, raising the question of whether it has the right infrastructure in place to 
do so. 
 
There is also going to be continual work for the British Embassy in Madrid to do 
back in London to make sure Spain is given appropriate consideration. The positive 
news in this regard is the increased quantity of visits from London-based senior 
government and civil service representatives to Spain since the Brexit vote, but 
the Embassy cannot rest on its laurels. Once a third country, the UK is unlikely to 
be putting weight on relations with smaller EU member states. The FCO will likely 
focus on the 5 or possibly 6 most important EU members, but other departments 
involved in international policy making will have a more reduced focus, with Spain 
potentially on the fringes depending on the subject matter. Importantly, the 
Treasury is unlikely to focus on 6-7 EU member states in depth. It will focus 
primarily on the G-7 and beyond that the G-20, with the Embassy in Madrid just 
able to get Spain in on the G-20 budget.  
 
Issues will also inevitably arise around prioritisation. The Political team within the 
Embassy may wish to work with Spain on the Maghreb region, but the Economic 
team has other priorities. Of course, this will also depend on reciprocation, on 
what Spain most wants to work on with the UK – mirroring wider prioritisation 
issues that the FCO will have to address in its bilateral relations with EU member 
states generally. Even in areas that do not infringe on EU competences, there is a 
sense that Spain is understandably somewhat reluctant to engage in new bilateral 
initiatives with the UK until there is more clarity on Brexit and the situation is more 
settled. Some Spanish departments such as the Ministry of Industry, Trade and 
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Tourism have been proactively seeking to work with the UK on issues of shared 
concern such as the WTO reform, China, and digital matters, but that has become 
more the exception rather than the rule.  
 
Brexit Britain and euro-enthusiast Spain: an awkward fit? 
Spain and most of its political class – both right and left alike – remain strongly 
pro-EU overall. The far-right VOX party, which appeared much later on the political 
landscape in Spain than its counterparts in Germany, France, Italy or elsewhere, 
performed poorly overall at the Spanish general election in April 2019, as well as 
the European, regional and local elections held the following month. Moreover, it 
has been far more focused on Spanish domestic issues such as the Catalan crisis, 
rather than positioning itself clearly on the EU question.  
 
Much as Brexit is anathema to Spaniards in general, a potential silver lining for 
Spain is that it could give it an opportunity to carve out a more leading role for 
itself in the EU, replacing the UK as one of the key players. Spain has long been 
considered to be punching below its weight in the EU.6 Former Socialist (PSOE) 
prime minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (2004-2011) proved unambitious on 
the world stage, while his Conservative (PP) successor Mariano Rajoy (2011-2018) 
became too heavily embroiled in the impact of the aftermath of the financial crisis 
on the country, as well as other domestic challenges such as the Catalan crisis. 
Although such domestic challenges persist, recent indications suggest that current 
Socialist prime minister Pedro Sánchez is seeking to carve out a role for Spain 
alongside France and Germany in the higher echelons of the EU, now that the UK 
is leaving and Italy has a Eurosceptic government.  
 
Holding office since June 2018 after ousting the Conservatives through a no-
confidence vote, the Socialists under Sánchez increased their number of seats to 
123 (out of 350) from 85 at the snap general election held in April 2019. They 
then went on to win the most seats of any party in the Socialist grouping of the 
EU parliament at the European elections the following month, putting them in a 
                                                          
6 For example, Charles Grant, ‘Will Spain remain a small country?’, Centre for European 
Reform Briefing Note, 1 May 2009. https://www.cer.eu/publications/archive/briefing-
note/2009/will-spain-remain-small-country  
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strong position to seek to increase their influence in the EU and get Spaniards into 
top EU jobs, where they have traditionally been under-represented.  
 
Sánchez appears more comfortable on the international stage and more ready to 
speak up in key European and international fora than his predecessors, Zapatero 
and Rajoy. That readiness does not automatically percolate down through the 
system, but the country’s top political analysts and think tankers are seizing on it 
as an opportunity to try and increase Spain’s weight in EU circles and beyond. 
Notably, the Royal Elcano Institute, headquartered in Madrid and with an office in 
Brussels, has set up a working group bringing together Spanish players from a 
variety of spheres (politics and administration, business and civil society) to 
analyse how to improve the country’s influence in the EU in the 2019-24 cycle, 
which appears to be very active and has already resulted in several publications 
based on the group’s presentations and debates.7  
 
For Brexit Britain to boost bilateral engagement with a country that is 
simultaneously trying to increase its role and influence in the EU is not 
straightforward, and there is recognition and understanding within FCO circles that 
Spain will not want to break away from the EU-27 pack on dossiers and policies 
going through Brussels. At the same time, however, Spain’s potentially increasing 
influence in the EU makes it all the more important to maintain strong UK-Spain 
relations if the UK is to manage to engage with the direction of the EU from outside 
its ranks. 
 
Nothing, however, is straightforward for Sánchez and the Socialists. While they 
may wish to increase Spain’s influence in the EU, they continue to face the 
challenges of a very fragmented national parliament in which five main state-wide 
                                                          
7 Examples of such publications available in English include: Miguel Otero-Iglesias & Ilke 
Toygür, ‘Sánchez must snatch the Economic Vice-presidency for Spain’, Real Instituto 
Elcano, Expert Comment 20/2019, 11 June 2019 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CO
NTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/commentary-oteroiglesiastoygur-sanchez-must-
snatch-economic-vice-presidency-for-spain; Ilke Toygür & Carlos Carnicero Urabayen, 
‘Spain’s influence in the European Parliament: an historical survey and predictions for 
the new political cycle’, Real Instituto Elcano, 21 May 2019, 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CO
NTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari56-2019-toygur-carnicero-spains-influence-in-
european-parliament-historical-survey-and-predictions-for-new-political-cycle  
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parties and several regionally-based parties have representation.8 As a result, at 
the time of writing in July 2019, they have not yet been able to secure the backing 
needed for Sánchez to be sworn in again as prime minister, which requires 
absolute majority support in a first-round investiture vote. With the centre-right 
Citizens (Cs) party ruling out a coalition government with the Socialists, and the 
Socialists themselves reluctant to form a coalition government with Podemos to 
their left since they would still lack an absolute majority, Sánchez wants to govern 
in minority in order to be able to shift alliances and seek support from different 
parties as needed. A second-round investiture vote only needs a simple majority 
if it comes to that, though governing effectively thereafter will not necessarily be 
easy without a strong majority, in a country unused to coalition-building.  
 
The April 2019 elections were Spain’s third in four years, and it has already had 
two different governments since late 2016, both of which have been its weakest 
governments ever due to unprecedented parliamentary fragmentation and the 
lack of coalition-making tradition at central government level. This has resulted in 
rapidly changing policy priorities, and inevitably made it difficult for many third 
parties to gain access to and influence on government.  
 
Outlook ahead 
To conclude, there is appetite on both sides for a stronger UK-Spain bilateral 
relationship, building on the collaborative work already being undertaken on a 
range of economic and public policy matters. The FCO’s appointment of a new 
senior diplomat in Madrid tasked with designing a new bilateral strategy for the 
UK in its relations with Spain, and a regional engagement strategy to underpin it, 
is a clear sign of the FCO’s commitment to fostering prosperous relations with 
Spain. This should help not only to maintain, but even to strengthen relations 
between the two countries in the difficult Brexit climate going forward.  
 
There are, however, also substantial challenges. Some of these are practical, 
regarding issues such as potentially insufficient collaboration between government 
                                                          
8 On the 2019 general election result, see, for example, Caroline Gray, ‘Spanish election: 
victory for Socialists as VOX surge fragments right-wing vote’, The Conversation, 29 
April 2019. https://theconversation.com/spanish-election-victory-for-socialists-as-vox-
surge-fragments-right-wing-vote-115962  
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departments on the UK side, or the still relatively new context of parliamentary 
fragmentation on the Spanish side, which makes seeking out channels of influence 
difficult. Others are more ideological in nature, arising from the perhaps rather 
awkward embrace, and potentially clashing priorities, between a country seeking 
to leave the EU and another seeking to gain weight and influence within that very 
organisation. The challenge for the UK in this regard is to find a way to mobilise 
the relationship to mutual benefit.    
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3. Bilateral Relations between the UK and the Visegrad Four 
after Brexit 
 
Balazs Szent-Ivanyi 
 
The UK has never viewed the four members of the Visegrad Group (V4; the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) as countries to be prioritized in bilateral 
relations, at least when compared to larger Western European countries. The four 
countries combined only accounted for 2.7 percent of British exports in 2016, and 
even the largest country, Poland only just made it into the top 20 export 
destinations of the UK.9 While Britain concluded bilateral investment treaties with 
all of the countries in the late 1980s, the four countries only represented around 
1.1% of the UK’s total outward foreign direct investment (FDI) stock in 2017.10 
These economic factors have been very much reflected in the diplomatic relations 
between the UK and the members of the group: while the UK has enjoyed good 
diplomatic relations with all four countries since their transitions to democracy in 
1989, these relations have never really stood out in any way. 
 
The importance attached to bilateral relations seems slightly different when 
viewed from the V4 capitals, and indeed some degree of asymmetry is present, 
again illustrated well by economic ties. The UK is a top export destination for all 
four; indeed, it was the second largest market for Polish exports in 2016; among 
the top five for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the ninth for Hungary. All 
four countries run trade surpluses with the UK in both goods and services. British 
investments are significant in each economy, with UK firms being among the top 
ten investors in terms of FDI stock in all four. The importance of the UK is further 
underlined by the fact that there are significant expatriate communities from all 
four countries living in the UK. Exact numbers are difficult to establish, but clearly 
the Polish community is the largest with more than one million members. The 
number of Hungarians (around 250,000) and Slovaks (around 100,000) in the UK, 
relative to the size of their home countries, is also substantial. Czech expatriates 
are perhaps the smallest group. 
                                                          
9https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/GBR/Year/2016/TradeFlow/EXPI
MP/Partner/by-country 
10 https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=FDI_FLOW_PARTNER# 
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There are some further differences and even cleavages between the four 
countries, which show that lumping them together under the Visegrad umbrella 
needs to be done with caution. First, Hungary, and more recently Poland have 
embarked on paths of authoritarianism, or, to borrow the preferred term of 
Hungary’s Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, “illiberal democracy”. Both countries have 
made attempts to limit the independence of the media and the judiciary, and the 
Hungarian government has enacted legislation to change electoral rules and limit 
civil society engagement. Due to these and other measures, both countries have 
had a highly confrontational relationship with the EU, and are currently being 
investigated for breaching the rule of law, under Article 7 of the Treaty on 
European Union. Slovakia and the Czech Republic, on the other hand, while 
certainly featuring a degree of populist politics and high levels of corruption, have 
remained democratic. Second, the approach of the V4 countries towards further 
EU integration differs. Slovakia is generally seen as the most pro-European 
country, with governing politicians repeatedly expressing enthusiasm about 
deepening EU integration.11 Slovakia is a member of the Eurozone, while the other 
countries are not, and nor is there an accession date for them in sight. Third, 
Poland is highly vocal about the need to contain Russia, while the other countries 
are less so; in fact, Hungary has clearly been developing close strategic ties with 
Russia. Fourth, EU Structural and Cohesion policy has been an important common 
cause for these four countries. While all four are significantly dependent on the 
inflows of EU funds, the Czech Republic is likely to become a net contributor to 
the EU relatively sooner than the others (by the mid-2020s), which may strain the 
cohesion of the V4 even further. 
 
A changed diplomatic strategy 
In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum in 2016, a flurry of diplomatic 
statements from the four countries emphasized how much they value their 
bilateral relationship with the UK, and that they see Britain as an “important” 
partner.12 All four governments expressed regret at the UK’s decision to leave the 
                                                          
11 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-slovakia-politics-eu/slovakias-future-is-with-core-
eu-not-eurosceptic-eastern-nations-pm-idUSKCN1AV1YY. 
12 See, for example: https://www2.aston.ac.uk/migrated-
assets/applicationpdf/lss/363132-V4_brexit_report.pdf 
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EU. Indeed, all four countries have seen the UK as a predictable ally in EU decision 
making: hiding behind the UK when the need arose to block measures towards 
greater integration was a favoured strategy in the region. The Czech Republic for 
example shared very closely the UK’s views on issues such as the internal market 
and the reform of the Economic and Monetary Union. Hungary was the only 
country to join the UK in opposing the selection of Jean-Claude Juncker to head 
the European Commission in 2014. There is a well-founded fear among the V4 
that with the UK’s departure from the EU, their voices will become weaker, while 
the influence of the traditionally pro-integration member states will increase. 
 
Britain has intensified its bilateral diplomatic efforts towards the four countries in 
the past years, clearly with the goal of building support among them and 
ultimately convincing them to push for a softer EU negotiating position on Brexit. 
Several visits from high ranking cabinet members to each country, and even by 
the Prime Minister Theresa May, who visited Poland twice and Slovakia once during 
her three-year tenure between July 2016 and June 2019, illustrate this well. There 
has been talk among ministers about using British foreign aid to “buy” the support 
of the Eastern European members.13 Perhaps the most visible element of these 
efforts however was the treaty on defence and security cooperation which the UK 
signed with Poland in December 2017. France is the only other European country 
to have a similar treaty with Britain, and Polish commentators did not miss the 
implicit symbolism. 
 
Despite the UK’s efforts and the asymmetric nature of the relationship, the extent 
to which the V4 are willing to go in support of the UK are, realistically speaking, 
limited. Due to their close economic integration and dependence on EU funding, 
as well as their close integration with the German economy, there will always be 
limits to how far these four countries will be willing to prioritise bilateral relations 
with the UK, especially if this is seen to come at the expense of their position in 
the EU. The UK may be the second largest market for Polish exports, but exports 
to Germany, the top partner, are more than four times larger exports to Britain. 
Government officials from the V4 have emphasized on numerous occasions that 
                                                          
13 https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/ministers-uk-aid-divert-africa-
to-eastern-europe-for-better-brexit-deal-a7588116.html 
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maintaining the current level of market access to the UK post-Brexit is important 
for them. However, the V4 economies are very heavily integrated into global value 
and supply chains, and the overwhelming majority of their trade is carried out 
within these networks. There is a view that Brexit will not hurt V4 trade 
significantly in the longer term, as these value chains will adapt, and certain 
activities will be moved away from the UK to new locations. V4 exports will 
continue, just not to the UK. 
 
The priorities of the V4 countries, stemming from this reality, were shown well 
throughout the Brexit negotiations. Despite comments from the Polish and 
Hungarian Prime Ministers about how the UK should be given a fair and flexible 
treatment, and some calls for changes in the EU’s united negotiation position,14 
neither of them actually broke away from the common position or challenged it 
when it would have actually mattered. The behaviour of the V4 during the Brexit 
negotiations clearly shows how it would be a mistake to read too much into casual 
political statements. 
 
Given this context, does it make sense for Britain to devote resources to enhancing 
bilateral relations with the Visegrad Four countries? It is possible that at least 
some of these four countries can promote interests similar to those of Britain in 
the EU, and can also be sympathetic towards UK interests in other international 
forums. While one must not have any illusions about the length these countries 
will be willing to go in terms of supporting the UK, especially if UK interests clash 
with those of Germany, there are some possibilities for mutual benefits.  
 
Possibilities for mutual benefits 
In the area of security, the UK shares mutual interests with all the V4, as well as 
other Eastern EU member states, especially the Baltic countries. All of the V4 
countries see NATO, and the UK’s presence and commitment within it as vital to 
their national security. While Britain has reinforced its commitment to NATO on 
several recent occasions, there are perceptions among the V4 questioning this. 
Security issues have been especially important for Poland, where the current 
                                                          
14 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2018/sep/20/salzburg-eu-summit-
brexit-theresa-may-polite-doing-her-job-eu-chiefs-non-committal-verdict-on-mays-
brexit-appeal-at-salzburg-politics-live?page=with%3Ablock-5ba3537fe4b0b5565ec309fd 
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government, led by the Law and Justice Party, sees the country to be under an 
existential threat from Russia. The 2017 UK-Poland treaty on defence and security 
cooperation, and the commitment to station British troops in Poland are both seen 
as important reassurances of the UK’s commitment towards regional security. 
Poland can be relied upon to promote a view of Russia similar to that of Britain 
within the EU. The other three V4 members, while also expressing the need to 
ensure the UK’s role in NATO, see the UK as vital more in terms of intelligence 
cooperation, especially in the field of counter-terrorism.  
 
The V4 also have a strong interest in maintaining an open international trading 
system, which is especially important given current global trends towards 
protectionism and the trade war between the USA and China. With the exception 
of Poland, all the V4 countries are small open economies, which are extremely 
dependent on the global business cycle, and thus have a strong interest in 
ensuring market access for their exports, both in Europe and beyond. So far, the 
British government has also been a strong proponent of open markets, and the 
talk about a post-Brexit Global Britain, open to trade, has been well received in 
the V4 capitals. A more protectionist EU is not in the interest of the V4 countries 
or the UK, and the V4 are likely to want to counter creeping protectionism in the 
EU. 
 
Given their shared interests with the UK, the V4 states would most likely support 
the emergence of any kind of future arrangements that would allow some degree 
of UK participation in EU decision-making. There is little precedent for such 
arrangements, and discussion on these is currently not on the table. But whatever 
form Brexit will eventually take, and whatever future relations emerge, the UK will 
not be able to ignore the fact that in order to access the single market, it will have 
to abide by its regulations. Those arguing that the UK, due to its size and global 
influence is not comparable to Norway or Switzerland clearly have a point, and it 
is thus not unrealistic to expect some form of joint EU-UK governance to emerge. 
If the V4 continue to see the UK as a like-minded partner, they will be supportive 
of such arrangements when the time comes. 
 
In order to ensure that the V4 continue to see the UK in this way, Britain will need 
to demonstrate goodwill towards the interests of these countries, or at least not 
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engage in actions that might alienate the V4. Three brief points follow in that 
context. First, as mentioned above, all four countries have sizable expatriate 
communities living in the UK, and V4 politicians have repeatedly expressed their 
desire to protect the rights of these people following Brexit. Safeguarding the 
rights of their citizens already in the UK has been seen as paramount national 
interest in all four countries, and the UK should not only live up to its generous 
promises regarding the future rights of these citizens, but also ensure that they 
are not disadvantaged in any way during their daily lives. That said, the V4 will 
most likely be relaxed about any future immigration regime the UK will implement. 
All of the countries, and especially Hungary, are experiencing severe skills 
shortages, and emigration has been an important – although not the sole – cause 
of this. More difficult access to the UK labour market for their citizens may actually 
benefit these countries. Second, and linked to the discussion on security issues, 
the UK has so far avoided using these as a bargaining chip with the EU, and it 
should refrain from this in the future as well, as it could alienate the V4. Finally, 
the V4 countries, and especially Poland and Hungary, due to their troubled 
relationship with the EU, may appreciate the emergence of Britain as a non-EU 
member power, in as much as ties with Britain provide them with an alternative 
to the EU, at least to some degree. While British foreign policy needs to be aware 
of potential criticism that it could receive from high level political engagement with 
these two increasingly authoritarian countries, their leaders will be grateful for any 
additional legitimization that they can derive from such engagement. 
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4. The UK-France Diplomatic Relationship 
 
Andrew Glencross 
 
The more than century-old Entente Cordiale (officialised in 1904) between France 
and the United Kingdom is sometimes breezily dismissed as a marriage of 
convenience. It is true that both these Europeans powers have long felt anxious 
about their ability to remain influential on the global stage and have turned to 
each other for mutual support. However, the strength of this bond is not to be 
underestimated, as illustrated by Prime Minister John Major’s landmark Chequers 
Declaration in 1995 that ‘President Chirac and I have concluded that the vital 
interests of one could not be threatened without the vital interests of the other 
equally being at risk’.15 Building on this shared perception of what constitutes an 
existential threat is thus the key to finding a common approach to global 
challenges that will prove increasingly significant in a post-Brexit environment.  
 
Before turning to the institutionalization of the UK-France diplomatic relationship, 
it is worth recalling the extensive history of bilateral business collaboration in 
modern times. Concorde, the daring project for a supersonic passenger jet that 
ended in commercial failure, is perhaps the most symbolic instance of such 
cooperation between the two nations. Yet the list of private-public partnerships 
also includes the Channel Tunnel, Airbus, the next generation Hinkley Point C 
nuclear reactor, and a growing number of electricity interconnectors. In this, way 
both economies are increasingly inter-linked in the energy sector despite the UK’s 
decision to leave the EU. 
 
Institutionalized cooperation 
What stands out when assessing the state of Anglo-French relations is the depth 
of cooperation that takes an institutional or treaty-based form, thereby securing 
it against the vagaries of political expediency or changes in leadership. In the field 
of immigration and border control, the much-maligned Le Touquet Treaty has 
                                                          
15 John Major, Joint Press Conference with President Jacques Chirac, 30 October 1995. 
Available at http://www.johnmajorarchive.org.uk/1990-1997/mr-majors-joint-press-
conference-with-president-chirac-30-october-1995/  
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provided for juxtaposed border controls since 2003.16 Senior French politicians 
have often criticised the terms of this arrangement, which in practice mean the 
area around Calais has become a staging post for migrants seeking to enter the 
UK illegally. But governments of left and right in France have not torn up the 
agreement, even in the throes of Brexit talks, because both states approach the 
issue of irregular immigration from the same security-centric perspective.17 In 
addition, expressions of French dissatisfaction provide useful leverage to secure 
UK funding for border infrastructure. 
 
The 2010 Lancaster House Treaties are the centrepiece of security cooperation 
born precisely of the mutual threat perception first expressed by Major and Chirac. 
These provide for a range of initiatives that by now have reached different stages 
of development. 18  The Combined Joint Expeditionary Force was declared 
operationally ready (for low and medium intensity combat) in 2016 and 
compromises maritime, land, and air components available for rapid deployment, 
reaching a force size of potentially 10,000 by 2020. Missile procurement is another 
area of exceptionally close cooperation under what is dubbed the One Complex 
Weapons Initiative. This resulted in collaboration on the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship 
Weapon, led by the industrial champion of European missile technology MBDA, 
currently in its conception phase until 2020, with a goal of entering production 
from 2024. The overarching aim is to realize the synergies of joint procurement, 
hence the other projects surrounding an unmanned combat air system, maritime 
mine countermeasures, and the establishment of a High Level Working Group for 
arms cooperation. The latter meets several times a year and brings together the 
UK Minister for Defence Procurement and France’s Director-General for 
Armaments. In the atomic field, Lancaster House established unprecedented 
sharing of test facilities for nuclear weapons and a joint hydrodynamics capacity 
known as TEUTATES for modelling the safety and performance of nuclear 
stockpiles without resorting to actual explosive tests. 
                                                          
16  This agreement entered in to force on 1 February 2004. 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/...data/.../6604.pd
f 
17 Black, James, Alex Hall, Kate Cox, Marta Kepe, and Erik Silfversten. "Defence and 
security after Brexit." Understanding the possible implications of the UKs decision to leave 
the EU. Overview report, Cambridge (2017). 
18 Ricketts, Peter. "National Security Relations with France after Brexit." RUSI Briefing 
Paper (2018). 
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These institutionalized ties constitute an anchor point that can withstand potential 
Brexit-related acrimony. This can be seen by the way the UK and France sought 
to extend the remit of their security partnership in the aftermath of the 2016 
referendum. Theresa May and Emmanuel Macron clearly had rather diverging 
views on the benefits of leaving the EU and on what terms this should happen, 
but this did not stop them from proceeding with joint initiatives. These included 
the 2017 French-British Action Plan to tackle terrorist and criminal activity 
online,19 leading to a common position in the G7 and EU on these issues. The 2018 
Sandhurst Summit saw both leaders commit to deepening bilateral ties in areas 
including education, sport, development, and climate change. Most concretely, the 
UK agreed to supply heavy lift capabilities to the Barkhane mission in the Sahel, 
while France gave the green light to contributing to NATO’s forward presence in 
Estonia as part of a UK-led battlegroup. 
 
A striking element of the Sandhurst get-together was the presence of both 
countries’ intelligence agency chiefs (MI5, MI6, GCHQ, DGSE, DGSI) who had 
never been assembled in this fashion before. This emphasis on increasing inter-
governmental contact is a key part of bilateralism post-Brexit, a message 
reinforced by the signing on the same occasion of a Foreign Policy and 
Development Compact.20 The agenda of this compact includes not just a joint 
commitment to promoting multilateralism and sustainable development, but also 
the establishment of further institutional means to achieve those ends. Two annual 
Strategic Ministerial Dialogues, on Foreign Policy and Development, and Foreign 
Policy and Defence are planned, along with an annual consultation of the heads of 
French and UK diplomatic services. These developments echo the successful joint 
training and reciprocal exchanges that exist between the militaries of both 
countries. 
 
Bilateralism nested in the EU context 
However, Anglo-French relations remain nested in a broader EU context that 
places the UK in an awkward situation following the 2016 referendum. France 
                                                          
19 https://www.gov.uk/...data/.../french_british_action_plan_paris_13_june_2017.pdf 
20 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/674884/Foreign_Policy_and_Development_Compact.pdf 
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automatically has the option to use the EU framework to pursue its goals and seek 
to shape foreign and security strategy accordingly. Brexit kills this automaticity 
for the UK. For instance, the European Commission’s paper on the future defence 
and security relationship21 notes that the UK cannot continue to host EU military 
operational headquarters (prior to the original Brexit date, Spain took over 
responsibility for Operation Atalanta, which had been run from the UK) or remain 
in command of EU operations. Thus British governments will need to rely on 
constructing opting in arrangements on a formalized or ad hoc basis. The contours 
of this approach – and especially the downsides this may bring – are apparent in 
developments in EU defence and security policy since 2016. 
 
In a clear sign of the need to maintain EU goodwill in order to recreate strong ties 
after it officially becomes a third country, the UK lifted its veto on a rise in the 
European Defence Agency budget in November 2016. In fact, the immediate post-
referendum period provided a new impetus to European security cooperation with 
the establishment of the European Defence Fund, the Coordinated Annual Review 
on Defence, and the Permanent Structured Cooperation programme (PESCO). 
Taken together, these moves, which the UK accepted, represent a concerted effort 
to endow the EU with the means for an autonomous capacity to act in the field of 
international security – a long-cherished French objective. 
 
By contrast, the UK struggles with the principle of EU strategic autonomy for fear 
of unsettling NATO. British reluctance goes a long way to explain the unfulfilled 
expectations created by the launch of the EU’s Common and Foreign Security 
Policy (CFSP) – itself a France-British co-production set in motion by the St Malo 
Declaration in 1998.22 Yet frustration with CFSP’s lack of bite can also be found in 
France, which is why the UK will remain a key partner even outside the EU. French 
willingness to bypass the EU where necessary is most evident in President 
Macron’s European Intervention Initiative whose goal is to establish a common 
European intervention force and a common doctrine for action, independent of the 
                                                          
21 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-
political/files/security_defence_and_foreign_policy.pdf 
22 Menon, Anand. "Empowering paradise? The ESDP at ten." International Affairs 85 no. 2 
(2009): 227-246. 
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EU.23 Ten European countries, including the UK, have signed a Letter of Intent to 
participate in the project, which aims to be more flexible and responsive than the 
EU when it comes to conducting operations. 
 
In this complex and evolving field, there is thus scope for strengthening the 
relationship between both countries, but Brexit poses a huge risk because France 
– as well as other countries – has to evaluate whether to accommodate UK 
requests for participation in EU security and defence structures. The EU will have 
an unprecedented ability to exclude the UK, as it decided to do with the military 
element of the Galileo satellite navigation system in 2018. This is a worrying 
precedent at a time when the UK seeks to find a way to participate in the work of 
the EDA, the EDF, and PESCO in the next phase of Brexit negotiations. Moreover, 
the domestic politics of negotiating a treaty-based security arrangement with the 
EU are far from simple. If the UK government wants to participate in the crime- 
and terrorist-fighting work of Europol and the European Arrest Warrant, it will 
have to accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the relevant 
areas. All this uncertainty, creates a serious commitment problem for the UK, 
whose indecisiveness over whether to pursue the Future Combat Air System as 
outlined in the Lancaster House treaty already pushed France to join forces with 
Germany to develop a next-generation fighter. It is no surprise then to hear Louis 
Gautier, tasked by President Macron to report on the state of European defence, 
tell the French Senate that Anglo-French relations “have become very difficult 
because of Brexit”.24 
 
Shared goals, heightened expectations 
Ultimately, Franco-British mutual attraction stems from shared global ambitions 
for which the EU itself is not always a necessary and sufficient instrument. A case 
in point is the two countries’ Indo-Pacific strategy. France has increased its focus 
on this region, as illustrated by the 2018 military cooperation agreement with 
India,25 which contains a number of French territories and is home to 1.5 million 
                                                          
23 Nováky, Niklas. "France’s European Intervention Initiative: Towards a Culture of Burden 
Sharing." European View 17, no. 2 (2018): 238-238. 
24 https://www.senat.fr/compte-rendu-commissions/20190513/etr.html#toc8 
25 https://in.ambafrance.org/Agreement-between-France-and-India 
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of its citizens. Although UK interests and military posture are different in this 
region, both countries are committed to pursuing freedom of navigation operations 
together, as in June 2018, or with their virtually overlapping regional allies. Yet 
this joint vision for upholding a liberal international order is nevertheless more 
complicated than before because Brexit requires greater coordination and new 
institutional structures to replace what automatically follows from EU membership. 
The coherence of French and UK sanctions policy, for instance, currently 
coordinated at the EU-level, will have to be sustained via a different mechanism.  
 
Although the outcome of the Brexit process is far from certain, what seems clear 
at this stage is that a new set of expectations about enhancing bilateral ties 
surrounds the UK-France diplomatic relationship. UK policy-makers appear to have 
heightened expectations of working with France because of the latter’s evident 
desire to partner for operations and weapons procurement in line with a shared 
understanding of global threats as well as responsibilities. Yet there is the very 
real possibility of Brexit-related disappointment, for one of two reasons. Firstly, 
the UK needs to be able to give a clear message about where and how it is willing 
to cooperate, something leaving the EU militates against by virtue of taking up 
government bandwidth and creating unprecedented political and policy instability. 
Secondly, it is not clear that France will always be able to deliver on UK 
expectations as many areas of foreign and security policy other EU countries will 
need to have their say when it comes to joint UK-EU enterprises. However cordial 
the Franco-British Entente may become, it is at best a partial replacement to, and 
not a substitute for, the EU as a multiplier of UK influence in the world. 
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5. Brexit and the UK-Turkey Relationship 
 
Yaprak Gürsoy 
 
In answering the question of how bilateralism can substitute for the “multiplier 
effect” of EU membership, the UK’s relationship with Turkey – a non-EU country 
at the periphery of Europe – offers interesting insights. As a “strategic” partner of 
the UK and an EU candidate country for more than three decades, Turkey’s 
relationship with the UK after Brexit will not be altered to the same extent as its 
relations with individual EU member states. Yet Turkey has been going through 
major shifts in its domestic politics and foreign policy that will lead to new 
opportunities and challenges for the UK. While Britain can increase its influence in 
multilateral diplomacy through its bilateral ties with Turkey, it will also have to 
tread carefully. More specifically, the UK will have to balance its relationship with 
the current Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) 
government alongside its ties to other EU and NATO allies and Turkish domestic 
opposition. The UK can play a crucial role mediating between Turkey and other 
countries especially in the aftermath of Brexit, with more freedom to establish new 
relationships outside of the EU. However, the amount of cooperation that the UK 
can have with the AKP government is limited by London’s own strategic and 
security interests. 
 
In foreign and security policy, since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Turkey 
has been involved in the conflict across its southern border. Aside from the 3.5 
million refugees that the country is hosting at the moment, the Turkish military 
has carried out operations in northern Syria, while southern Turkish towns near 
the border were the scene of attacks. The Turkish government has perceived 
Kurdish elements’ increasing control of northern Syria as the most important 
security threat arising from the civil war. Turkey has claimed that the Kurdish 
Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) and its military arm, 
People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG), are directly affiliated 
with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK). Since the 
mid-1980s, Turkey has been fighting on its own territory against the PKK, also 
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recognized as a terrorist organisation by NATO and the EU. The US, however, has 
cooperated with the PYD and YPG, especially in its fight against ISIS.26  
 
The NATO dimension 
This difference between Ankara and Washington over the Syrian conflict has had 
serious consequences for Turkey’s position in NATO. In part to fend off attacks 
from its southern border, Turkey has been working on the procurement of an anti-
missile system. Ankara first made an attempt to buy the American Patriot system 
in 2013, but this request was rejected by the American Congress. Ankara then 
initiated a tender and made a deal with the Chinese company CPMIEC, only to 
cancel it due to American pressure. Finally, Ankara has decided to purchase a 
missile defence system from Russia. Russia provided support to the Erdoğan 
government during 2016 coup attempt, leading to a rapprochement between 
Moscow and Ankara. Reflecting these good relations, in 2017, Turkey signed a 
deal with Russia for the purchase of the S-400 missile system. Since then, the US 
and NATO have argued that the S-400s are not compatible with the alliance’s 
systems and could enable Russia to gain access to NATO technology. The US has 
warned Turkey that if it goes through with its purchase of the S-400s, its 
contribution to the production and procurement of the F-35 Lightning II fighter 
jets would be cancelled and the US would retaliate with economic sanctions on 
Turkish companies.  
 
Turkey’s relationship with the US is thus at a historic low point.  At this juncture, 
the UK might be in a unique position to act as an intermediary between 
Washington and Ankara. The UK was also one of the countries that condemned 
the 2016 failed coup attempt the fastest, which did not go unnoticed by President 
Erdoğan, who declared two years later that “we will never forget the solidarity 
shown with our country.” 27 The UK is also one of the nine countries that is 
                                                          
26 Yaprak Gürsoy and Ilke Toygür, Turkey in and out of NATO? An instance of a turbulent 
alliance with Western institutions, Royal Institute Elcano (2018) 
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CO
NTEXT=/elcano/elcano_es/zonas_es/defensa+y+seguridad/ari73-2018-gursoy-toygur-
turkey-in-out-nato-turbulent-alliance-western-institutions 
27 Turkish president hails strong relations with Britain 
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/turkish-president-hails-strong-relations-with-
britain/1144052  
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participating in the F-35 project. Although Britain is now preoccupied with Brexit 
and it might be too late to overturn the purchase of Ankara’s S-400s, in the future, 
the UK could take the lead in preventing the further deterioration of relations. This 
would give London the multilateral edge it seeks through bilateral ties. 
 
Another consequence of Ankara’s strained relationship with NATO has been its 
drift from European allies. There have been reports of interruptions of German 
arms to Turkey, increasing tensions with France and Netherlands, Ankara 
interfering against Austria’s cooperation with NATO and the questioning of the 
status of the Incirlik joint air base in southern Turkey. 28  The eastern 
Mediterranean dispute over the exclusive economic zones around the island of 
Cyprus has flared up as well, leading to renewed tensions  with Greece.29 These 
developments clearly show that Ankara’s disputes are not only with the US, but 
with many other nations in NATO. The UK is currently one of the few countries 
that has managed to increase military cooperation with Turkey, as reflected in the 
multimillion deal between BAE Systems and Turkish Aerospace Industries to 
develop the TF-X Turkish Fighter Jet Programme.30 
 
Despite the possible role the UK can play as a broker in NATO, there might also 
be challenges that London would have to face in its bilateral dealings with Turkey. 
Ankara and London do not necessarily have the same threat perceptions. The 
Kurdish issue is still central to Turkish foreign and security policy with no 
resonance in the UK. However, Russia is a major concern for the UK although 
Turkey has been strengthening ties with its former Cold War adversary. It is 
unclear how long this marriage of convenience between Ankara and Moscow would 
last, but if it gets too deep, the UK might be forced to reconsider its engagement 
with Turkey. For example, Turkey’s relations with Qatar wavered over the TF-X 
engine deal between Rolls-Royse and the Kale Group.31 The UK government’s 
                                                          
28 Turkish tensions undermine its role in NATO, Politico, 29 June 2017 
https://www.politico.eu/article/turkish-tensions-undermine-its-role-in-nato/  
29 Greece and Cyprus call on EU to punish Turkey in drilling dispute, The Guardian, 18 
June 2019 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/18/greece-and-cyprus-call-on-
eu-to-punish-turkey-in-drilling-dispute  
30 Britain, Turkey sign defence deal to develop Turkish fighter jet, Reuters, 28 January 
2017 https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-turkey-bae/britain-turkey-sign-
defence-deal-to-develop-turkish-fighter-jet-idUKKBN15C0IM   
31 Turkey and UK battle to save fighter jet project, Financial Times, 
https://www.ft.com/content/9b6d7af6-6d6a-11e8-92d3-6c13e5c92914  
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concerns over the sharing of sensitive information with Qatar became a point of 
contention, which can be replicated in the future in other deals involving other 
countries.  
 
Domestic Turkish concerns 
On the domestic front, Turkey has been struggling with an impending financial 
crisis. The Turkish lira lost 40% of its value in the summer of 2018, inflation 
reached 20 percent, unemployment increased to nearly 15% and the economy 
contracted after years of steady growth. There are political reasons behind this 
crisis. Turkey has had a referendum, general and local elections for three 
consecutive years now, which encouraged the government to follow policies that 
would stimulate the economy, instead of combating inflation rates. President 
Erdoğan’s reservations about and public statements against increasing interest 
rates have also contributed to the crisis by decreasing market confidence in the 
viability of the government’s economic plans. There are, however, deeper 
structural reasons for the recession. Turkey’s growth in the last decade was due 
to cheap foreign credit. The availability of such credit globally shrank after the 
Federal Reserve in the US increased interest rates. Continuing tensions with the 
US also mean that Turkey has not been able to borrow from the American markets 
as easily and faced tariffs to its steel exports to the US. The overall current account 
deficit of Turkey has also contributed to the crunch. 
 
In this volatile context, Turkey’s trade relations with the UK have special meaning. 
Turkey’s second largest export destination is the UK (after Germany). The UK is 
also the only big European country with which Turkey enjoys a trade surplus. 
Therefore, Ankara values its commercial ties with the UK and worried about the 
potential consequences of a hard Brexit. Turkey’s EU customs union membership 
is currently working to its advantage in maintaining the trade surplus. However, 
in the event of a hard Brexit, Ankara would not be able to immediately sign a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) with London due to the same customs union agreement.32 
Both sides have repeatedly asserted their willingness to continue commercial 
relations, but not much can be done until it becomes clear what kind of a deal the 
                                                          
32 Yaprak Gürsoy  Why would a third country root for a soft Brexit? Views and Lessons 
from Turkey, Foreign Policy Centre (2019)  https://fpc.org.uk/why-would-a-third-
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UK will have with the EU.  In the event that the UK concludes an FTA with the EU, 
Turkey could also be covered in this deal, either by pressuring the EU for such 
participation or by simultaneously working with Ankara to sign a similar deal taking 
effect at the same time.  
 
Indeed, there is a good chance that the future EU-UK deal, if it covers customs, 
could be applied as a model for Turkey’s relationship with the EU. Turkey has been 
dissatisfied with its customs union agreement for a long time now and has been 
looking for ways to improve its own economic partnership with the EU. With 
membership prospects dwindling further, both the EU and Turkey are more willing 
to reconsider the future of their relationship. Therefore, the outcome of the Brexit 
negotiations in the long run could be an inspiration for reframing Turkey’s bilateral 
ties with the EU. In this way, and unexpectedly, the UK can see its multilateral 
influence expand toward other non-EU countries. The UK would see this “multiplier 
effect” work more substantially if it also negotiates with the EU with this wider 
perspective in mind rather than having a narrower focus on its immediate and 
short-term self-interest. 
 
Political stability in Ankara 
In considering its bilateral relations with Ankara after Brexit, the final challenge 
that London faces is related to the question mark hanging over the stability of the 
regime in Turkey. Since the 2016 coup attempt, critics in and out of the country 
have accused the AKP government of being increasingly authoritarian, violating 
human rights, repressing the media, and annihilating the rule of law. Turkey 
transitioned to a presidential system with the 2017 constitutional referendum that 
in effect meant that President Erdoğan’s power and authority have substantially 
increased. The government was also restructured with nine new councils chaired 
by the president, including the economy and the security and foreign policy 
councils. The number of ministries was reduced to 16 and their influence were 
reduced. Overall, it is unclear how (or to what extent) these changes will be 
reflected in Turkey’s foreign policy-making practices. In light of the renewed 
Istanbul mayoral elections won by the opposition, there is also a real chance that 
the rule of the AKP might come to an end in half a decade and it is not yet clear 
what kind of repercussions this type of governmental change would have on the 
presidential system. However, for now, critics stress that these institutional 
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changes are a sign of authoritarianism. Obviously, these anxieties are closely 
related to the looming financial crisis (as market actors are wary of the risks of 
investing there) and deteriorating relations with NATO allies and the EU. 
 
There are also critical voices in the UK regarding the regime in Turkey.33 So far, 
UK diplomacy has been able to balance good relations with Ankara while raising 
concerns over human rights and democracy.34 This will continue to be a challenge 
for London. It is critical for the UK to continue to have relations with the AKP 
government, without alienating the opposition parties, civil society organizations, 
academics and intellectuals in Turkey. In dealing with Ankara, London should 
maintain connections with different groups in this diverse society that has become 
quite polarized in recent years. With half a million people of Turkish origin living 
in the UK, thousands of Britons buying property in Turkey and 2.5 million tourists 
from the UK visiting Turkey each year, continued personal interactions between 
the two countries would help keep all channels of communication open. 
 
In summary, Turkey has been going through a rough patch in its foreign relations, 
economy, and domestic politics. In the era of Brexit, continued links and 
partnership with Turkey would give London a unique opportunity to sustain its 
multilateral influence. The UK can serve as a mediator in NATO and as a model for 
the future of EU-Turkey relations, as long as it can continue its dialogue with 
diverse groups in Turkey, work towards strengthening its trade relations and focus 
on its mutual security interests with Ankara. 
  
                                                          
33 The UK’s Relations with Turkey, Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons 
(2017). https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/foreign-affairs-committee/news-parliament-2015/uk-relations-with-turkey-report-
published-16-17/   
34 May warns Turkey’s Erdogan not to lose sight of democratic values, Reuters, 15 May 
2018. https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-turkey/may-warns-turkeys-erdogan-not-
to-lose-sight-of-democratic-values-idUKKCN1IG1YM   
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6. The International Relations of the UK’s Nations and Regions 
following Brexit 
 
Carolyn Rowe 
 
The UK’s international relations are not solely concentrated in the hands of 
Westminster. As with any liberal democratic state, the reality of “international 
relations” sees national interests expressed and promoted through a variety of 
different state, non-state and sub-state channels. Led by economic imperatives 
and by constitutional rights, sub-state governments are now firmly positioned as 
actors within the global order, signalling a fundamental challenge to some of the 
core logics of the modern international system. The new reality is one of perforated 
sovereignty and “paradiplomacy,” a multiplicity of internationally organised 
actors, and a semi-hierarchical power structure where nation state governments 
no longer fully dominate the international order.35 Clearly, the UK’s departure from 
the EU complicates the existing picture of sub-state paradiplomatic activity of its 
constitutionally empowered authorities. And it gives rise to a number of questions 
to which in a practical sense, sub-state actors will have to devise answers.  
 
There are two principal axes along which both the constitutionally empowered UK 
nations and the English regions will have to reconfigure their international 
activities and agendas after Brexit. Firstly, there is the British regional footprint in 
Brussels itself. All of the UK’s sub-state territories have maintained direct offices 
in Brussels since the 1990s, though these differ in role and ambition. Their new 
post-Brexit remit is still to be determined, in particular, the issue of how to 
manage bilateral, sub-state relations. Relationships with sub-state actors from 
other EU member states have been a powerful means of shoring up support for 
domestic agendas on European issues; beyond this, there are numerous 
international profiles to reconsider. This leads then to the second, and arguably 
most significant, dimension of how Britain’s nations and regions will pursue 
international agendas after Brexit: the domestic politics of foreign affairs. Will they 
have a voice? Both these axes will be considered in detail. 
 
                                                          
35 Tavares, Rodrigo (2016) Paradiplomacy. Cities and States as Global Players (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
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The EU footprint of Britain’s nations and regions after Brexit 
This is the most significant area where engagement will have to be recalibrated 
post-Brexit, and is certainly the most visible aspect of the new ecology of British 
regional representation to the EU2. Currently, there are three different types of 
regional representation to the EU: legislative regions, economic regional actors, 
and non-constitutional actors. Each will face significant challenges in remodelling 
their operation after Brexit and are examined in turn below. 
 
Much of the diplomatic work of carried out by the Brussels offices of the Scottish 
Government, the Welsh Government and, once power-sharing is restored, the 
Northern Ireland Executive, will continue, albeit with a somewhat different remit. 
The Brussels offices of the devolved authorities in the UK currently provide support 
to ministers travelling to Brussels for European Council meetings, something which 
will no longer be necessary. Nonetheless, and possibly more relevant, will be the 
support which these offices offer to their ministerial colleagues for engagement 
with the European Commission, the European Parliament and other relevant 
networks where they may gain a foothold as third county members. If anything, 
the incentive structure for representatives from Britain’s devolved authorities to 
foster relations in Europe, facilitated through the networks which these regional 
representative offices maintain, is enhanced after Brexit, particularly in times of 
non-contiguous partisan governments. An SNP-run Scottish Government, for 
instance, will see direct relations with other states, sub-state governments and 
regions, as a fundamental means by which to shore up support for their own EU 
policy preferences, particularly when these run counter to the dominant wishes of 
any Westminster administration. As has hitherto been the case, the intelligence 
provided through the Brussels representation can empower Scottish actors within 
domestic negotiations and the building of a UK position, though this itself will in 
future be articulated outside rather than within the EU’s decision-making 
machinery. 
 
The challenge for Britain’s devolved authorities in Brussels as they move from 
having formal to informal powers of influence36 will be to make effective use of 
                                                          
36 Tatham, M. (2018) ‘The Rise of Regional Influence in the EU – from Soft Policy 
Lobbying to Hard Vetoing”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 56, No. 3, pp. 672-
686. 
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their new status as third country actors. Their post-Brexit position as 
constitutionally empowered sub-state entities from non-EU member states, or 
‘third countries’, instantly aligns them, on a political level, with the Canadian 
provinces or the US states, for example. Here, new relations will have to be forged, 
where common interests can seek to shape EU policy through collaborative 
lobbying from the outside. 
  
Complementary to the political and diplomatic work of the devolved authorities, 
we have seen economic development agencies from Scotland and Wales in 
particular establish a presence in the European Union, with the overarching aim 
of “economic promotion”. This bland phrase covers a multitude of financial aims, 
from the showcasing of regional investment opportunities to the numerous actors 
who circulate within Brussels decision-making networks, as well as looking to 
engage in opportunities to secure EU funding. These require cross-national 
partnerships, both within the EU or at times also beyond even the EEA members, 
and economic regional representations are a primary means by which both 
awareness of these funding programmes can be brought to the relevant domestic 
actors, and through which networks of like-minded authorities can be constructed 
as a way to submit an application for funding. Beyond securing funding, these 
networking opportunities also offer scope for bilateral partnership building and 
support an exchange of expertise.  
 
Most English regions continue to maintain a presence in the European Union for 
the time being, sometimes in partnership with other regional actors such as 
organisations from the cultural and voluntary sector, universities or individual city 
authorities. Along the lines of the economic regional actors described above, their 
chief motivations are “pull factors” of financing schemes, rather than the 
constitutional “push factors” of a need to engage directly in EU policy decisions 
that supported the development of the constitutional regions’ presence in 
Brussels. Whilst many are keen to engage in upstream policy work, their remit, 
and the chief measure by which their effectiveness is assessed in the domestic 
context by their supporting partners, remains financial. This is not likely to change 
in the immediate post-Brexit era, though with a more fluid founding rationale than 
that sustaining the sub-state nations’ representations, their domestic clients may 
question the longer term viability of membership until results are proven. For the 
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English regions, their geographical status as European authorities, as opposed to 
cities and regions from other continents who maintain an EU presence, may 
however offer some additional access points to policy and funding networks. The 
regions of Norway for instance, might offer a blueprint here. These engage in 
numerous, horizontal policy networks focused on themes such as environmental 
protection, consumer issues or research and innovation policy. The European 
Regions Research and Innovation Network (ERRIN – www.errin.eu), a successful 
alliance which promotes sub-state interests in Europe’s research and innovation 
landscape, is supported by the mid-Norway European Office, the North Norway 
European Office and the Stavanger Region European Office, amongst others. 
 
Renewing Britain’s bilateral relations: a voice for the nations and regions? 
Brexit changes the entire incentive framework for building international 
partnerships between sub-state entities, overnight. The UK’s constitutional 
authorities have established strong horizontal partnerships with other 
constitutionally empowered legislative regions in other EU member states. Their 
representative offices in Brussels have been particularly successful in facilitating 
these networks, but they are sustained also through ministerial visits and 
partnerships and other exchanges. Together, constitutional regions have been 
able to lobby for political changes at the EU level (take for instance the Conference 
of European Regions with Legislative Power, or RegLeg grouping, and its work on 
the introduction of a subsidiarity watchdog for the EU),37 in addition to promoting 
joint policy objectives. Collaboratively, strong sub-state actors with a powerful 
political resource base within their member state have been able to upload their 
policy preferences to the EU. After the UK leaves the EU, its constitutional 
authorities will no longer have the option to pursue influence by this formal route, 
which means that the domestic route for securing influence becomes strategically 
even more significant.  
 
Intergovernmental tensions over the new bilateral relations will have to be 
resolved within the domestic polity, just as disputes over EU policy in the past had 
to find agreement within the UK’s policy-making nexus. With the lack of any formal 
                                                          
37 See for instance Martinico, G. (2018) ‘History of a (Limited) Success: Five Points on 
the Representativeness of the Committee of the Regions’. In Perspectives on Federalism, 
Vol. 10, Issue 2, pp. 96-117 
38 
 
system, however, for intergovernmental agreement on international affairs, new 
mechanisms will have to be established. As a means to regulate this 
intergovernmental cooperation going forward, both the British Government and 
the UK’s devolved authorities are in the process of negotiating a host of “common 
frameworks”. These would offer coherence in policy development across the UK 
after EU withdrawal, by setting out, for instance, common goals, minimum or 
maximum standards, harmonisation, or mutual recognition 38  thereby 
safeguarding the functioning of the UK’s own single market.39 
  
A common framework will clearly be needed to cover one of the most contentious 
areas of the UK’s future bilateral relations – trade. The UK government has already 
highlighted free trade deals with third countries as a priority area where a robust 
mechanism for intergovernmental cooperation is required, and fast.40 This is one 
area where competing agendas are likely to develop, and have the potential to 
spill over into public spats. In a post-Brexit world, Scotland’s trading interests will 
be dependent on the UK’s bilateral, rather than the EU’s multilateral, agreement 
with external partners. So whereas regions with similar constitutional resources 
such as Bavaria will be able upload their preferences on future EU trade deals both 
domestically, by holding their national government to account through the federal 
system, and at the EU level, through alliance building with like-minded, and 
predominantly other constitutionally-empowered, regions, Scotland’s formal 
powers on international trade will be reduced to the extent to which they can 
shape the UK’s national negotiating position on future bilateral agreements. Thus, 
the shape and scope of this particular common framework is driving considerable 
reflection on how such a model can be established.41 
  
                                                          
38 Joint Ministerial Committee communiqué, 16 October 2017 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-ministerial-committee-communique-
16-october-2017  
39 Policy Paper: Legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European 
Union - Foreword from the Prime Minister. (2017, May 15). 
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40 Ibid. 
41 In March 2019, following an extensive inquiry, the Scottish Parliament’s Finance and Constitution 
Committee, for instance, published a report on common frameworks that addressed precisely this 
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In conclusion, the work of British regional representations in the EU can be 
subsumed under three headline activity areas: diplomatic engagement, economic 
development, particularly in the sense of engaging in pan-European networking 
schemes to draw down European funding, and cultural promotion. Of these three, 
the diplomatic endeavours of the constitutionally empowered Scottish 
Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive will experience 
the most substantive reconfiguration after Brexit. Access to governmental lines of 
communication will be cut off as they transition from internal decision-makers with 
a seat around the table at Council meetings on devolved matters, to external 
observers, albeit with a strong vested interest in policy outcomes. Other regional 
engagement in the EU after Brexit will be dependent largely on the extent to which 
subscribing partners in the UK which support these offices feel that they continue 
to deliver value for money. 
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